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Ongoing debates about the adoption of the agricultural biotechnology in the developing
countries and EU have dominated the literature in development economics and
biosciences. This dissertation considers some environmental, economic and social
consequences of the technology from three perspectives: 1) the impact of the ongoing
pest density on the performance of the agricultural biotechnology in India; 2) trade
consequences of EU restrictive trade policies towards biotech products; and 3) the
adoption decision of the technology in the EU and the developing economies.
Agricultural biotechnology appears to be successful in increasing yield and reducing the
use of pesticides. However, most studies fail to consider the dynamic effect of the pest
population. Pests are getting more resistant to the biotech seeds. I use a stochastic
production function to capture the impacts of inputs on the mean of the output and the
effect of pest density on the variability of the output. The results show that, due to the
presence of new pests, the productivity of the damage control inputs such as biotech
seeds and the insecticides decreases.

The ban on the agricultural biotechnology products by the European countries has
affected trade flows between EU and its trading partners. I use the international-tradegravity-model to assess the trade impacts of EU policies towards agricultural
biotechnology products. The results show trade creation in the Food and Live Animals
category. However trade diversion was found in the Beverages and Tobacco and Animal
and Vegetable Oils and Fats categories.
Using a general equilibrium and comparative statics analyses, I determine the
impact of the enforcement of the Intellectual Property Rights, consumers’ preferences
and externalities on the production of biotech crops. The results show that efficient
production of biotech crops under the influence of these three factors is contingent upon
the output elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech productions, total factor
productivity in biotech production, and the ratio of the proportions of the biotech and
non-biotech products consumed by each consumer
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND ISSUES OF AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY

Modern biotechnology encompasses a variety of methods for modifying living
organisms according to the purposes of the scientists. The technology’s application across
medical, pharmaceutical, chemical, environmental and agricultural uses is spreading
quickly across the globe. While biotechnology is accepted in other sectors, agricultural
biotechnology, which is known as GMOs, is encountering some obstacles in various
countries. Agricultural biotechnology can be put into three categories: production-trait
applications, output-trait applications and bioengineered products applications (Brenner,
1998). The most common production-trait applications are herbicide tolerance and insect
resistance which have been developed for extensive use in crops cultivation. Moschini et
al., 1999, described herbicide tolerance crops as being modified with a gene found in a oil
bacterium that allows plants to metabolize herbicides. Insect resistant varieties of maize,
cotton, soybean and wheat, have been genetically modified to generate pesticidal
property of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) that produces a protein toxic to certain insects
(Harlander, 1993).
Agricultural production has always been risky, and characterized by large annual
variations in crop yield. The risks to the yield can originate from weather (drought,
floods, hail and frost), from soil conditions (salinity, nitrogen depletion and erosion),
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from disease (rot, fungal and rust), and from pests (bacteria, viruses, nematodes, insects
and animals). North America scientists made the breakthrough by developing GM-crop
varieties to reduce production risks. For instance, new GM varieties of conventional
crops have been created with higher degree of stress tolerance to ecological conditions
and with a higher degree of resistance to pests and disease (Isaac, 2002).
The adoption and the commercialization of biotech crops have reached several
countries around the World. Biotech crops were first commercialized in 1996. Biotech
crop hectares increased by an unprecedented 100–fold from 1.7 million hectares in 1996,
to over 170 million hectares in 2012 (Clives, 2012). In 2012, the number of hectare of
biotech crops grew at an annual growth rate of 6%, up 10.3 million from 160 hectares in
2011. Figure 1.1 shows that the growth rate of biotech crops increase faster in developing
countries than industrial countries from the year 2010. In 2012, growth rate for biotech
crops was at least three times as fast, and five times as large in developing countries, at
11% or 8.7 million hectares, versus 3% or 1.6 hectares in industrial countries (Clive,
2012).
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Figure 1.1: Trend of biotech hectarage of developing and industrial countries

Source: James, Clive. 2012. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2012. ISAAA Brief No. 44

According to 2012 report of ISAAA, developing countries grew more, 52%, of
global biotech crops in 2012 than industrial countries at 48%. Of the 28 countries which
planted biotech crops in 2012, 20 were developing countries and 8 were industrial
countries. In 2012, Sudan and Cuba have adopted Bt cotton and Bt maize, respectively.
The number of farmers growing biotech crops was 17.3 million farmers in 2012, up 0.6
million from 2011(See Figure 1.2 below).
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Figure 1.2: Developing versus Industrial Biotech Countries

Source: James, Clive. 2012. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2012. ISAAA Brief No. 44

The technology is widely used in the US with 69.5 million hectares and an
average of 90% adoption across all crops. Brazil takes the second place for the fourth
consecutive year with a record increase of 21% from 2011 (from 6.3 million to 36.6
million). With 23.9 million hectares, Argentina kept its third place, followed by Canada
with 11.8 million hectares. India with its 10.8 million of hectares of Bt cotton took the
fifth place. In Africa, only Sudan, South Africa, Burkina Faso and Egypt are currently
planting biotech crops.
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Figure 1.3: Non-Biotech and Biotech adopting Countries

Biotech: Green/ Non-Biotech: Yellow
Source: James, Clive. 2012. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2012. ISAAA Brief No. 44

As shown in Figure 1.3 above, the agricultural biotechnology is widely used in
the North America than any other parts of the world. Since the technology is highly
embedded with economic implications (Isaac, 2002), its substantial use in the North
America where the enforcement of the IPRs is very effective, makes more sense. A place
like Africa where the enforcement of the IPRs does not exists; the adoption rate of the
technology is very low. In other words, the lack of effective regulatory system in small
and poor countries continues to be the major constraint to adoption (Clives, 2012).
Despite the increasing adoption rate of the agricultural biotechnology, consumers still
express some reluctance regarding the products. Some consumers express economic,
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human safety and health, biodiversity, moral, ethical and religious concerns about biotech
products. Consumer acceptance is critical for the future of biotech agriculture. For
example, Monsanto’s shares dropped from US$ 51 in May to US$ 38 October 1999,
because shareholders are concerned about consumers’attitudes towards GM crops (Public
Ledger 1999a).Consumer acceptance has been a key issue for various groups active in
the development of biotech crops.
According to economic theory, if the use of GM crops reduces the relative price
of agricultural goods, consumers will purchase more, so long as agricultural goods are
normal. The economic concerns of the consumer regarding biotech crops may be
viewed in broader perspectives. For example, a high concentration of research capacity,
providing well-paying jobs, may have positive impact on the consumer acceptance. On
the other hand, consumers may perceive that most of the benefits go to the large, private,
multinational firms commercializing GM crops, with no benefit to them. This kind of
perception among consumers may have negative impact on consumer acceptance of the
technology.
With respect to human safety and health concerns, consumers are afraid of getting
sick in the long- run after the consumption of biotech products. Specifically, the concern
is that toxigenic, pathogenic, infective or invasive changes to the plant may affect human
health and safety (Isaac, 2002).These concerns will have negative impact on consumer
acceptance of GM crops.
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Biodiversity concerns are also raised among consumers; the issue is that farmers
producing herbicide-resistant GM crops will apply herbicides in a reckless, irresponsible
manner in order to control weeds. By doing so, they can harm diversity and contaminate
ground water. With that in mind, some consumers will refrain from purchasing GM
crops. Moral and ethical concerns of GM technologies are raised by the fact that many
private firm scientists advocates for the use of GM crops solely to enhance their own
monetary rewards. Indeed, the owners of the technology deserve some compensation,
but the compensation must be limited by some moral and ethical boundaries. Private
leadership of the GM technology has raised several questions among consumers. For
example, Ho (1998) argues that the shift from public leadership in research on
biotechnology to private leadership is associated with several substantial problems. The
profit- seeking motives behind innovative attitudes towards GM technologies fail to
address public interest. The public interest comes into play only when it comes to
commercialization. Therefore, given the profit motives, private scientists can no longer
be trusted to act in a moral and socially ethical manner.
After exploring current issues surrounding the agricultural biotechnology, I
construct this dissertation which comprises three essays. In the first essay, the impact of
the proliferation of new pests on biotech crops yield was considered. The performance of
the technology was evaluated in India using the stochastic production function in order to
capture yield risks caused by the additional applications of pesticides due the presence of
the secondary pests such as aphids and jassids.
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In order to consider the impact of consumer acceptance of GM technologies, I
extend the dissertation to the second essay which deals with the EU preferences and
policies towards GM crops. The idea is to determine trade related consequences of such
policies which are significantly affected by consumer preferences. I found strong
evidence that EU restrictive trade policies have caused trade diversion in the import flows
from the Rest of the World. Trade creation was also found.
The third essay is a theoretical exercise. Considering consumer attitudes towards GM
products, the enforcement of the IPRs by the private seed companies and the presence of
negative externalities of the biotech seeds, I investigate the impact of these three factors
on the production of biotech using general equilibrium and comparative statics analyses.
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CHAPTER 2
CROP YIELDS AND ONGOING PEST DENSITY:
EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF BIOTECH CROPS IN INDIA

Abstract: Several studies have evaluated the performance of biotechnology crops and
found that the technology is successful in increasing yield and reducing the pesticides. In
contrast, most studies fail to consider the dynamic aspect of the pest population, even
though the pests are getting more resistant to both pesticide-producing crops and the
pesticides. The pest density kept growing and different types of new pests kept emerging
regardless of the amount of pesticides sprayed. The objective of this paper is to evaluate
the performance of biotechnology crops in India, taking into account the pest density. I
use the stochastic production function to capture the impacts of the inputs on the mean of
the output and the effect of pest density on the variability of the output. Insecticides
squared and human-labor squared are used as proxies for the pest density in order to get
more accurate econometric estimation. Furthermore, comparative analysis is conducted
between biotech and non-biotech crops using the elasticities of the insecticides and
human labor with respect to the yield. The results show that the presence of new pests
upon the adoption of the biotech seeds has nullified the productivity of the damage
control inputs such as biotech seeds and the insecticides.
Keywords: Biotechnology crops, pest density, stochastic production function, India
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2.1. Introduction and Background
Biotechnology (BT) crops have been developed to substitute for conventional
crops across the globe. They have been commercialized for more than a decade. BT
crops were designed by companies like Monsanto, Syngenta, and others to produce
natural insecticides that fight against pests. Farmers in some developing countries have
embraced the technology, and it seemed to be successful in terms of a reduction in
pesticide use and increasing yields. Eighteen developing countries like South Africa,
Burkina-Faso, China, and India adopted the technology over the period of 1996-2010
(James, 2010). In particular, India has been cultivating BT crops, mostly cotton and
maize, since 2002. Previous studies that evaluated the performance of the technology
have undertaken farmer-level analysis using survey data, and their results are quite
similar. More detailed results of some studies that have been done are provided in Table
2.1. below.
However, these studies did not take into consideration the dynamic evolution of
pest density. For example, there are some sucking pests like aphids and jassids over
which BT crops have no control, and farmers still need to increase the use of insecticides.
These secondary pests, which increase in numbers as other more traditional pests targeted
by the GM crops, can result in causing significant damage to BT crops. In Australia,
pesticide use against bollworms has dropped, but farmers still spray their BT cotton fields
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with insecticides 4.6 times per year (Qayam et al, 2002). Furthermore, in the state of
Andhra Pradesh in India, farmers growing BT crops increase the numbers of sprays
against the secondary pest aphids more than farmers growing conventional crops. (Report
on production practices, 2002). Even in the US, where the BT crops have been widely
used, insecticide applications against bollworms have declined by half due to the
introduction of BT crops; however, total insecticide use has remained stable due to the
increasing importance of the secondary pests (Benbrook, 2003).
The strategies of the Integrated Pest Management, which include the use of BT
crops, were developed with little attention to the dynamics of pests or the role of
predators, parasites, and others biological control organisms. As a matter of fact, the
combination of insecticide resistance and resurgence of cotton bollworm, cotton aphid,
and other pests had become a major threat to cotton production in China (Wu and Guo,
2005). In order to get a more comprehensive idea of the issue of pest proliferation due to
the adoption of the BT crops, we would like to make use of the history. For instance,
before the 1970s, aphids could easily be controlled by treating seeds with insecticides. In
the mid-1970s, aphids became a prominent pest of cotton owing to an insecticide-induced
resurgence in mid-and late season (Wuhan, 1980 and Guo, 2003). The increasing aphid
damage to cotton was caused by the insecticide sprays against H.armigera, which kill
most natural enemies of the aphid, such as ladybeetles and lacewings. Therefore, the
reduction in predation mingled with a high resistance to insecticides has resulted in major
yield losses (Xing et al., 1991). Furthermore, we need to emphasize the roles of target
pests, and nontarget pests in the proliferation of the secondary pests. In the cotton field
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for example, the target pests are cotton bollworm and pink bollworm, and the nontarget
pests are mirids and aphids. Cotton field experiments in China show that mirid density is
significantly higher on nonsprayed BT cotton than on sprayed non-BT cotton owing to a
reduction in the number of insecticide applications against H. armigera. (Wu and Guo,
2005). In addition, the substitution of broad spectrum chemical pesticides, with a narrow
spectrum toxin such as BT, would result in a higher concentration of secondary pests
(Wang et al., 2008)
This suggests that the mirids have become key insect pests in BT cotton fields,
and their damage to cotton could increase further with the expansion of BT cottongrowing areas if no additional measures are adopted. Consequently, BT crops are not the
ultimate pest management strategy given the dynamic proliferation of the secondary
pests. Considering the resistance management of target insects, the greatest threat to the
continued efficacy of BT cotton against H.armigera is evolution of resistance (Burd et
al., 2003 and Wu et al., 2002).
In sum, the reduction in chemical pesticide use associated with BT crops
production is increasing the abundance of some insects and improving the natural control
of specific pests such as cotton aphids. In contrast, chemical control, especially the use of
more specific, less disruptive compounds, remains important for controlling
nonlepidotrean pests such as mirids and spider mites (Wu and Guo, 2005).
From the economic perspective, some studies show there is no economic benefit
for farmers planting BT crops compared with those who planted conventional crop seeds.
Wang et al. (2008) in their survey, suggest that the main reason for the eroding advantage
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of BT cotton was the increasing prevalence of the secondary pests for which BT was
never designed to control and the higher cost of BT-cotton seeds. For example, from
1999 to 2004, the quantity of pesticide used to control secondary pests increased several
fold in the four provinces which were subject to the studies conducted in China.
Similarly, the pesticide used to control secondary pests in 2004 dominates that for 2001
at all levels of use, thus suggesting that pesticide expenditures due to secondary pests has
increased the cost of production (Wang et al., 2008).
The goal of this paper is to consider the presence of the secondary pests in order
to provide more accurate evaluation. Using a Just-Pope production function, we consider
risky elements that affect yield variability. In general, farmers cannot accurately predict
either the population growth of the pests that could attack their crops in the next
generations or the rainfall that could favor the presence of pests. In many agricultural
situations, both pest density and rainfall are very important variables (Shankar et al.,
2008).
2.2.Theoretical Approach
Following Qaim et al (2005) and Shankar et al (2008), we use a Just-Pope
production function in which Y accounts for yield, X is an input vector, and Z represents
pest density. The production function is:
=
(

+
)

∑
)] 1/2,

(1)
∑

(2)
∏

∑

} (3)
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Inserting equations (2) and (3) into (1), the model becomes:
∑

∑

∑

} (4)

The subscripts i, j and t stand for state, crops, and the time period, respectively. The
coefficients

and α are related to the inputs and the pest density, respectively. The

effects of the inputs on the mean of the output are given by (

)

the effects of the pest density on the output variance are portrayed by
∑

and
(

)

, under the assumption that

normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 1. Therefore, the error term

is
is

normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
∑
Q(

) follows quadratic spline specification, and

follows Cobb-Douglas

specification, assuming the constant returns to scale. Equation (4) is estimated using the
Maximum Likelihood method. Saha et al., (1997) use Monte Carlo experiments to show
that the Maximum Likelihood method for a stochastic production functions provides
unbiased and more efficient estimates than FGLS.
2.3. Data Description
This study is conducted using the data from India Agricultural Department
between 1996 and 2009. The data covers 19 states in India and 7 crops which are cotton,
maize, wheat, paddy, urad, gram, and rapeseed &mustard. We encountered some
difficulties because some states do not produce all the 7 crops, and some crops were not
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produced during the entire period selected. For example, the state of Assam did not
produce cotton, gram, maize, or wheat, only produced urad between 2008 and 2009, and
produced paddy and rapeseed and mustard (R&M) between 1996 and 2009. Similarly, the
state of Andhra Pradesh produces gram (from 2005-2006), cotton, maize, paddy, and urad
for the entire period; but did not produce wheat and R&M. Another difficulty is that only
the costs of insecticides are available, but for the production function we need the
physical quantity of insecticide inputs. We thus use the cost share of insecticides relative
to the total costs of cultivation instead. For lack of data on capital, interest paid on
working capital is used as proxy for inputs of capital. In the context of this paper, we use
the yield (Qtl/hect) as output of 7 crops such as cotton, maize, paddy, gram, urad, gram,
R&M, and wheat. Cotton, wheat, and maize are considered the major biotech crops in
India (James, 2010).The inputs are seed (Kg.), fertilizer (Kg. Nutrients), manure (Qtl.),
human labor (Man Hrs.), animal labor (Pair Hrs.), insecticides and capital. The pest
density is captured by counting the number of the species of insects, weeds, and fungi
that attacked the crops considered in this study. Figure 2.1 provides an idea of the
different types of pests. It shows that BT crops (cotton, wheat and maize) endure a strong
pressure from insects, while non- BT crops are usually attacked by fungi and weeds.
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Figure 2.1: Different types of pests per crops
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Source: Indian Agricultural Department

Table 2.2 describes the data used for biotech crops (cotton, wheat and maize) and
table 2.3 provides the description of the data used for non-biotech crops (paddy, gram,
urad and rape& mustard). After deletion of the missing observations and the removal of
the outliers, the number of observations came down to 111, 101, and 59 for cotton, wheat
and maize, respectively. Among the biotech crops, cotton is extensively cultivated in
India and as it is described in table 2.2, it is human labor, insecticides and capital
intensive crop. In other words, the cultivation of cotton cost more for farmers than that of
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wheat and maize. For example, on average the cultivation of cotton requires 763.69
manual hours of
human labor, 79% of the total the cost goes into the purchase of insecticides and 325.90
R.S. interests are paid on the working capital. Similarly, the cultivation of wheat on
average requires 428.71 manual hours of human labor, 40% of the total cost spent on
insecticides, and 245.53 R.S. interests paid on the working capital. In the same way,
maize necessitates 579.80 manual hours, 20% on the total costs for insecticides and
227.94 R.S. interests paid on the working capital, on average. Table 2.3 describes the data
used for the non-biotech crops (paddy, urad, and gram and rape &mustard). The number
of observations are 171, 66, 74 and 86 for paddy, urad, gram and rape&mustard,
respectively.
On average, human labor is heavily used in the cultivation of paddy than on any
other non-biotech crops. For example, 823.19 manual hours is dedicated to paddy
compared to 327.85 manual hours devoted to the cultivation of gram. 70 % of the total
cost is used on insecticides and 326.46 R.S. interests are paid on the working capital for
the cultivation of paddy. As for urad, gram and rape&mustard, the cost share of
insecticides are 0.9%, 11% and 0.61% respectively. The amount of manual hours used in
the cultivation of urad and gram are relatively the same and that of rape&mustard is
438.17 manual hours on average.
In sum, the cultivation of cotton is more expensive in India than that of other
biotech crops and the cultivation of paddy is also more expensive than that of other nonbiotech crops.

19

2.4.Estimation Methods
Equation (4) is estimated with the Maximum Likelihood under heteroscedasticity
following the three -step process described by Just and Pope (1979). Specifically,
Harvey’s multiplicative heteroscedasticity is considered to estimate the model
parameters. We have defined i =1… n inputs, j = regions and the time periods. In the
procedure, we define

= [1,

], where we consider

the suspected variables

causing heteroscedascity. In the context of this paper, the pest density is specified as the
main factor causing heteroscedasticity because it may affect the variability of the yield
under the adoption of the agricultural biotechnology. Some other factors such as rainfall,
agroecological factors and farmers’ education level could affect the variability of the
yield, but they are not considered in this paper due to lack of data. Furthermore, we
believe that the emergence of the new pests is followed by additional applications of
pesticides or insecticides which require additional human labor. In other words,
additional human labor is devoted to spraying activities to combat new pests. As a result,
the quadratic forms of insecticides and that of human labor are considered as proxies of
pest density which is not easy to measure. Despite the fact that different types of pest that
attacked each crop are known, this information is not sufficient for an econometric
estimation. Therefore, in our model

is defined as follow:
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2.5.Estimation Results
The estimation of the equation (4) was conducted for each of the 7 crops
separately because the contribution of the inputs to the yield and the agroecological
conditions for the crops are not identical across India. The estimation results of each crop
are presented from table 2.4 through table 2.10 presented below. Since the goal of this
study is to evaluate the performance of biotech crops taking into account the presence of
new pests, we are only interested in the estimates of insecticides, insecticides squared,
human labor and human labor squared. In the mean equation, their coefficients are
interpreted as the expected value of yield with respect to the variable inputs. For example,
the estimates with positive coefficients lead to an increase in the excepted value of yield
and the estimates with negative values trigger a decrease in the expected value of yield.
As for cotton, the expected value of the yield increases by 5.0425 kg with an additional
1% of the total cost spent on insecticides. The negative coefficient of the insecticides
squared could be explained by the emergence of new pest that has nullified the yield
increasing characteristics of the insecticides. In other words, cotton yield experiences
diminishing returns at the presence of the new pest despite the damage control
characteristics of the insecticides. Similarly, the negative coefficient of human labor
squared also shows diminishing returns effect of the additional manual hours spent on
spraying insecticides. In the mean equation, unlike the coefficient of human labor, the
coefficient of insecticides is highly significant. Turning to the variability of the yield,
human labor squared and insecticides squared which are considered as proxies of the pest
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density exhibit negative and significant impact on the variance of the yield. That is,
additional applications of the insecticides and extra manual hours of work due to the
presence of the new pests reduce the risk on yield. The yield risk reducing effect could be
coupled with the fact that biotech cotton seeds generate natural insecticides. Wheat which
is also biotech crop experiences similar impact of insecticides, insectides squared, human
labor and human labor squared on the yield in both the mean and the variance equations.
Unlike, cotton and wheat, maize has a different pattern in terms of yield effect of
the inputs. For example in the mean equation, the insecticides have negative impact on
the yield but not significant. Human labor has positive and significant impact on the
yield. In the variance equation both exhibit risk reducing impact on the yield and this is
due again on the fact that maize is a biotech crop. Furthermore, the R2 from the
estimation of the equation (4) for cotton, wheat and maize are 0.6339, 0.8393 and 0.8466,
respectively.
Considering the estimation results from the mean equation for non-biotech crops (paddy,
gram and urad), insecticides and insecticides squared have positive impact on the yield as
opposed to biotech crops. The explanation for this is that these crops are not targeted by
the secondary pests and once the primary pests are killed by the insecticides, additional
applications of the insecticides can only contribute to an increase of the yield.
However, these additional applications of the insecticides can also be harmful to
the crops at the certain points and they may even impede productivity (Lichtenberg et al.,
1986). As a result, the coefficients of the insecticides squared and human labor squared in
the variance equation are positive for paddy and it means that additional use of the inputs
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can be risky for the yield. As for the human labor, it exhibits diminishing returns to scale
in the mean equation for paddy. The applications of the insecticides on urad increase
yield by 5.00018 kg and the coefficient on the insecticides squared in the mean equation
is positive. Similarly, the coefficients of human labor and human labor squared are
positive in the mean equation. In the variance equation, insecticides squared have risk
reducing effect but not significant and human labor squared has risk increasing effect.
The results on urad are not surprising because it is not targeted by any major pests. In
case of rape &mustard, both insecticides and human labor experience diminishing return
effect on yield in the mean equation and risk increasing effect from the variance equation.
2.6. Comparative Analysis between Biotech and Non-Biotech Crops using the
Output Elasticities
Even though the yield of all the crops is measured in kilogram, it would be
misleading by comparing the productivity of insecticides in the cotton field to the
productivity of insecticides in the field of wheat despite the fact that both are biotech
variety. The comparison of the productivity of the inputs will be more misleading when it
occurs between biotech and non-biotech crops. In order to overcome this discrepancy,
output elasticities of insectides and human labor are used. For biotech crops, we choose
cotton and wheat since they are the major biotech crops in India and also are more
targeted by the new pests. As for non-biotech crops, we chose Urad which is not targeted
at all, and paddy which is relatively targeted by the new pests. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show
the relationship between output elasticities of insecticides and insecticides, and output
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elasticities of human labor and human labor for cotton. Output elasticities of the
insecticides are positive which means that 1% increase in insecticides increase the yield
when the cost share of the insecticides is between 0 and 1.7. Output elasticities of
insecticides become negative when the cost share of the insecticides is greater than 1.7.
Similarly, output elasticity of human labor is zero at 199 manual hours of work and
become negative from 200 manual hours of work. In other words, as the applications of
the insecticides and the number of manual hours increase, the elasticities of these inputs
increase as well but under the pressure of the pest density, they decrease and become
negative. Similar trend is found for wheat which is also a major target for the sucking
pests ( see Figures 2.4 and 2.5).
For paddy which is a non-biotech variety widely cultivated in India, output
elasticities of the insecticides increase and are positive as the applications of the
insecticides increase but at a decreasing rate (Figure2.6). Output elasticities of human
labor increase and are positive when human labor increase up to 1000 manual hours of
work and become negative after 1000 manual hours of work (Figure 2.7). For urad which
is not targeted by any pests, the output elasticities of the insecticides increase sharply as
the applications of the insecticides increase (Figure 2.8). Also, the elasticities of human
labor increase at an exponential rate as the human labor increases (Figure 2.9).
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2.7.Conclusion
The results from the stochastic production function show that both biotech
varieties and insecticides contribute to the increasing yield, while the insecticides
experience diminishing returns on yield due to pest density. From the comparative
analysis, we found that the yields of the non-biotech crops are almost exempt from the
threat of the emerging pests and the use of insecticides was successful in increasing yield.
The key point is that the biotech seed increase and reduce the use of pesticides but under
the threat of the new pests, these features of the biotech seeds are offset.
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Table 2.1: The Results of Some Studies on BT Crops
Countries
Argentina

Year and rate
of adoption
1995(0.7%)
1998 (3.6%)
2000 (5.4 %)
2001-02 (5%)

India

March 2002
2005 (25%)

Australia

19961997(8% )
20012002(30%)

Author

Findings

De Janvry and Qaim
(2002)
IV estimates and
Quadratic
specification of the
yield function
Qaim et al.,(2006)
Profit function

Bt technology reduces applications
rates of toxic chemicals by 50 %, and
increase the yield significantly

James Clives, 2001

The average number of sprays
required by Bt cotton is 40 % less
than that required y non-BT

Kristen et al., 2002

Both large-scale and small-scale
farmers enjoy financial benefits due
to higher yields and despite higher
seed costs

Insecticides amount on Bt plots were
reduced by 50%
Lower insecticide expenditures
Higher Yield and Profit ( $45
revenue per acre for Bt cotton)

USA

1996 (14%)
2001 (34%)

Edge et al.,2001

The findings after 5 yr.
of commercial use on >2 × 106 ha
globally indicate
that Bt cotton provides an effective
method for
lepidopteron control that is safer to
humans and the
environment than conventional
broad-spectrum
insecticides, making Bt cotton a
valuable new tool in
integrated pest management.

Burkina- Faso

2005

Vitale et al., 2008

The first three years of Bt cotton file
trials shows that Bt cotton increased
yields by an average of 20% and
reduced insecticide applications by
two-third
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics- Biotech Crops in India
VARIABLES
COTTON
Yield
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
WHEAT
Yield
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
MAIZE
Yield
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides

N

MEAN

STD. DEV

MIN

MAX

111
111
111
111
111
111
111
111

12.55
17.18
113.04
13.08
763.69
52.693
325.90
0.79

8.00
31.53
53.98
12.78
273.74
40.75
142.35
0.63

2.53
0.00
2.69
0.00
184.87
0 .13
24.28
0.02

46.47
156.49
308.46
61.34
1617.30
150.80
728.83
3.80

101
101
101
101
101
101
101
101

27.87
117.63
128.90
9.76
428.71
36.16
245.53
0.40

10.67
37.23
56.18
16.38
137.14
35.68
82.41
0.64

5.05
3.53
18.73
0.00
163.56
0.41
71.04
0.04

48.34
157.99
236.79
83.58
802.06
179.20
405.94
2.37

59
59
59
59
59
59
59
59

22.12
26.38
105.84
18.80
579.80
63.32
227.94
0.20

10.68
18.63
57.19
15.56
163.39
27.34
148.26
0.35

6.41
1.56
24.39
0.00
286.23
4.35
49.40
0.00
2

45.66
117.32
258.54
50.49
1267.40
111.57
694.83
2.33
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics Non- Biotech Crops in India
VARIABLES
PADDY
Yield
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
URAD
Yield
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
GRAM
Yield
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
RAPE&MUSTARD
Yield
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides

N

MEAN

ST. DEV

MIN

MAX

171
171
171
171
171
171
171
171

34.09
45.01
124.20
19.58
823.19
79.23
326.46
0.70

12.58
39.83
68.34
15.61
253.12
72.753
151.04
0.84

2.19
0.00
0.68
0.00
121.71
0.40
76.68
0.001

70.53
115.92
265.35
80.42
1327.30
259.37
726.40
3.62

66
66
66
66
66
66
66
66

4.93
22.61
16.55
2.15
346.94
43.09
152.97
0.09

2.08
7.03
19.33
3.16
88.86
34.64
144.01
0.16

2.16
6.75
0.00
0.00
94.20
1.51
49.14
0.0006

12.94
39.98
82.84
19.80
578.73
109.95
716.84
0.91

74
74
74
74
74
74
74
74

9.52
67.65
34.83
1.89
327.85
36.08
177.10
0.11

2.91
24.00
31.67
8.95
128.65
19.86
94.13
0.18

5.05
1.24
1.70
0.00
185.18
2.49
59.65
0.0002

19.90
101.19
157.48
73.83
801.91
83.61
555.61
0.95

86
86
86
86
86
86
86
86

14.10
7.71
91.64
6.90
438.17
55.48
203.09
0.061

11.25
11.02
42.69
9.18
151.48
71.71
110.10
0.07

4.33
0.00
8.17
0.00
229.47
0.36
57.95
0.0003

68.01
85.17
212.89
45.31
999.87
244.29
593.56
0.36
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results: Cotton
COTTON
Variable
Mean Equation:
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
Seed Squared
Fertilizer Squared
Manure Squared
Human labor Squared
Animal labor Squared
Capital Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
Variance Equation:
Human labor Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
R-Square
Log-likelihood Function

Estimated Coef.

Std. Error

T-Ratio

-0.29066
0.29021e-01
0.10500
0.38707e-02
-0.69757e-01
-0.23211e-01
5.0425
0.27044e-02
-0.54806e-04
-0.23080e-02
-0.20611e-05
0.14101e-03
0.53386e-04
-1.5010
10.350

0.9359e-01
0.2746e-01
0.6923e-01
0.9771e-02
0.2905e-01
0.1365e-01
1.265
0.6244e-03
0.7701e-04
0.1212e-02
0.4265e-05
0.2202e-03
0.1663e-04
0.3899
4.692

-3.106
1.057
1.517
0.3961
-2.402
-1.701
3.985
4.331
-0.7117
-1.904
-0.4833
0.6405
3.209
-3.850
2.206

-1.1558
-0.21893
17.395

0.1757
0.8068e-01
2.311

-6.580
-2.713
7.529
0.6339
-292.655
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results: Wheat
WHEAT
Variable
Mean Equation:
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
Seed Squared
Fertilizer Squared
Manure Squared
Human labor Squared
Animal labor Squared
Capital Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
Variance Equation:
Human labor Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
R-Square
Log-likelihood Function

Coef.

Std. Error

T-Ratio

0.17615
0.17703
0.34118
0.66168e-01
-0.83836e-01
-0.12816e-01
9.2862
0.32071e-03
-0.40069e-03
-0.35215e-02
-0.64594e-04
0.20123e-03
0.27535e-04
-0.95707
-19.355

0.5345e-01
0.4904e-01
0.7422e-01
0.2373e-01
0.3801e-01
0.2271e-01
2.544
-0.3332e-03
0.2001e-03
0.8967e-03
0.2102e-04
0.1826e-03
0.4497e-04
1.264
7.359

3.295
3.610
4.597
2.789
-2.206
-0.5642
3.651
-0.9624
-2.002
-3.927
-3.072
1.102
0.6122
-0.7570
-2.630

-1.7494
-0.10943
22.861

0.2253
0.3301e-01
2.664

-7.763
-3.315
8.580
0.8393
-264.641
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results: Maize
MAIZE
Variable
Mean Equation:
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
Seed Squared
Fertilizer Squared
Manure Squared
Human labor Squared
Animal labor Squared
Capital Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
Variance Equation:
Human labor Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
R-Square
Log-likelihood Function

Coef.

Std. Error

T-Ratio

0.12230
0.18022
-0.13023
0.68475e-01
-0.22665
-0.97700e-02
-3.2416
-0.59176e-03
-0.10903e-03
0.27271e-02
-0.54003e-04
0.16169e-02
0.25934e-04
2.0264
-9.9866

0.1520
0.5478e-01
0.1796
0.2955e-01
0.9505e-01
0.2386e-01
5.693
0.1235e-02
0.1954e-03
0.3591e-02
0.2187e-04
0.8736e-03
0.3017e-04
3.015
10.69

0.8047
3.290
-0.7252
2.317
-2.385
-0.4096
-0.5694
-0.4792
-0.5581
0.7594
-2.470
1.851
0.8596
0.6721
-0.9341

0.99676
-0.90357e-02
-9.9059

0.3488
0.4574e-01
4.392

2.858
-0.1975
-2.255
0.8466
-165.196

33

Table 2.7: Estimation Results: Paddy
PADDY
Variable
Mean Equation:
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
Seed Squared
Fertilizer Squared
Manure Squared
Human labor Squared
Animal labor Squared
Capital Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
Variance Equation:
Human labor Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
R-Square
Log-likelihood Function

Coef.

Std. Error

T-Ratio

-0.19637e-01
0.10464e-01
0.18718
0.63727e-01
-0.13911
0.58779e-01
4.6177
0.34276e-03
0.26452e-03
-0.91656e-03
-0.31437e-04
0.52031e-03
-0.86614e-04
0.41329
-11.942

0.5200e-01
0.4657e-01
0.8198e-01
0.1022e-01
0.3278e-01
0.1705e-01
2.222
0.5050e-03
0.1423e-03
0.1267e-02
0.5899e-05
0.1068e-03
0.2167e-04
0.7484
4.716

-0.3776
0.2247
2.283
6.238
-4.244
3.447
2.078
0.6788
1.859
-0.7234
-5.329
4.873
-3.998
0.5522
-2.532

0.10745
0.12774
2.2259

0.1478
0.2596e-01
1.968

0.7271
4.920
1.131
0.8075
522.395
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Table 2.8: Estimation Results: Gram
GRAM
Variable
Mean Equation:
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
Seed Squared
Fertilizer Squared
Manure Squared
Human labor Squared
Animal labor Squared
Capital Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
Variance Equation:
Human labor Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
R-Square
Log-likelihood Function

Coef.

Std. Error

T-Ratio

-0.42595
-0.19779e-01
-0.83036
0.16128e-01
0.52853e-02
0.37025e-02
2.6911
0.36428e-02
0.11935e-03
0.12306e-01
-0.20307e-04
-0.71215e-04
0.11355e-04
1.9970
16.244

0.4852e-01
0.2334e-01
0.7821e-01
0.8033e-02
0.3806e-01
0.7475e-02
3.400
0.3828e-03
0.1258e-03
0.1093e-02
0.8066e-05
0.4600e-03
0.1056e-04
3.616
2.169

-8.779
-0.8476
-10.62
2.008
0.1389
0.4953
0.7914
9.517
0.9489
11.25
-2.518
-0.1548
1.076
0.5523
7.489

-1.3101
-0.96204e-01
15.084

0.2639
0.4068e-01
3.039

-4.965
-2.365
4.963
0.7108
132.280
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Table 2.9: Estimation Results: Urad
URAD
Variable
Mean Equation:
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
Seed Squared
Fertilizer Squared
Manure Squared
Human labor Squared
Animal labor Squared
Capital Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
Variance Equation:
Human labor Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
R-Square
Log-likelihood Function

Coef.

Std. Error

T-Ratio

-0.32444
-0.44943e-01
-0.18465
0.26941e-02
-0.40901e-01
0.10619e-01
5.0018
0.83973e-02
0.13992e-02
0.73911e-02
0.16335e-05
0.22352e-03
-0.11661e-04
0.89312
6.0029

0.1638
0.3149e-01
0.1269
0.7707e-02
0.2324e-01
0.5432e-02
2.379
0.3258e-02
0.4695e-03
0.8049e-02
0.1262e-04
0.2076e-03
0.6979e-05
2.855
2.125

-1.980
-1.427
-1.455
0.3496
-1.760
1.955
2.103
2.577
2.980
0.9183
0.1294
1.076
-1.671
0.3128
2.825

0.53898
-0.61026e-02
-6.1227

0.3130
0.4290e-01
3.530

1.722
-0.1422
-1.734
0.7074
-99.8746
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Table 2.10: Estimation Results: Rape& Mustard
RAPE&MUSTARD
Variable
Mean Equation:
Seed
Fertilizer
Manure
Human labor
Animal labor
Capital
Insecticides
Seed Squared
Fertilizer Squared
Manure Squared
Human labor Squared
Animal labor Squared
Capital Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
Variance Equation:
Human labor Squared
Insecticides Squared
Constant
R-Square
Log-likelihood Function

Coef.

Std. Error

T-Ratio

-0.29410e-01
0.10813
0.33716
0.94445e-01
-0.65112e-01
-0.79434e-01
39.034
0.19066e-02
-0.18093e-03
-0.89593e-02
-0.11140e-03
0.18247e-03
0.24118e-03
-154.06
-8.3632

0.2612
0.2128e-01
0.7755e-01
0.1127e-01
0.1109e-01
0.9448e-02
12.21
0.3355e-02
0.1078e-03
0.2134e-02
0.1442e-04
0.5412e-04
0.2781e-04
46.17
2.517

-0.1126
5.082
4.348
8.380
-5.871
-8.407
3.196
0.5682
-1.678
-4.199
-7.724
3.372
8.674
-3.336
-3.323

1.6723
0.49639e-04
-16.597

0.2155
0.4109e-05
2.602

7.762
12.08
-6.379
0.6089
282.400
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Figure 2. 2: Output Elasticities of Insecticides: Cotton

Figure 2.3: Output Elasticities of Human Labor: Cotton
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Figure 2.4: Output Elasticities on Insecticides: Wheat

Figure 2.5: Output Elasticities of Human Labor: Wheat
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Figure 2.6: Output Elasticities of Insecticides: Paddy

Figure 2.7: Output Elasticities of Human Labor: Paddy
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Figure 2.8: Output Elasticities of Insecticides: Urad

Figure 2.9: Output Elasticities of Human Labor: Urad
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CHAPTER 3
EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY PREFERENCES AND
POLICY: TRADE CREATION OR TRADE DIVERSION?

Abstract: One of the current issues in International Trade is the European restrictive
trade policies on the agricultural biotechnology products from the rest of the World. The
ban on these products by the European countries is likely to have had some impact on the
trade flows between EU and its trading partners. I use the gravity model of international
trade to assess the trade impacts of the EU trade policies towards the agricultural
biotechnology products. The results show trade creation in Food and Live Animals.
However, trade diversion was found in Beverages and Tobacco, Animal and Vegetable
Oils and Fats.
Keywords: Agricultural Biotechnology, Gravity Model, Trade Creation and Diversion,
Panel Data
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3.1.Introduction and background
The European Union’s restrictive policies towards biotechnology are closely
dependent upon the attitudes of European consumers towards the biotech products. In
Europe today, public opinion is more influential when it comes to the adoption of a
technology. Negative attitudes were developed towards biotechnology since the
occurrence of two major health crises: contaminated blood and mad cow disease
outbreaks (Joly and Lemarie, 1998). Since these disease crises, European consumers have
become very cautious about biotech foods and crops, and they have developed distrust
towards their public regulation and expertise. Comparing the regulations of agri-food
production of the US to those of the EU, the US focuses on regulating the end product
and the EU has the tendency to regulate the whole production process. In general, US
policies tend to be more supply-driven, while EU policies are dominated by consumer
concerns (Hanitios, 2000). US consumers more often trust the Food and Drug
Administration and United State Department of Agriculture scientists and more often
accept the consumption of biotech crops and foods approved by these institutions. The
difference between US and EU policies towards the agricultural biotechnology is that EU
consumers influence the policy decisions and US consumers trust their officials and go
for what is approved by food and safety officials. As a result, consumers’ preferences
should not be neglected when it comes to EU policies towards biotech crops and food. As
in the EU, public opinion actively constrains and influences the course of development of
biotechnology (Durant, Bauer and Gaskell, 1998). For example, in the EU, bovine
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somatotropin was not approved as a result of the resistance of a large amount of
consumers who expressed animal health and welfare concerns (Gaskell, 2000).
Growth and trade consequences of EU preferences and policies towards the
agricultural biotechnology should not be overlooked. These growth and trade
consequences could be addressed within EU countries, between the EU and biotech
adopting countries, and between EU and non-biotech adopting countries. This paper
discusses only trade effects between the EU and the rest of the World. The ban on both
production and consumption of the agricultural biotechnology products has been an issue
in European trade relationships with the rest of the World. The technology which is
widely used by the North American countries is being transferred to the developing
countries. Even though some developing countries are still reluctant to the technology
due to the fear of loss of export to Europe, other are adopting it and are investing more in
biotechnology research and development. Some authors argue that restrictive European
Union policies on biotechnology production and consumption work in a manner similar
to that of an export subsidy of capital to the South. That is, the South will become more
capital intensive by producing more biotech products. North America will become the
dominant producer of biotechnology research and development and biotech products, and
the European Union will become dominant producer of traditional agricultural products.
Francis et al. (2005) conclude that when factors are measured in efficiency units, the
South will become more capital-intensive, EU will become relatively less capital
intensive, leading to lower exports of capital intensive goods and smaller overall of trade.
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The weakness of these arguments is the lack of empirical evidence. Both trade and
growth effects of the restrictive EU biotechnology policies have not been empirically
determined in the current literature. The motivation behind this paper is to show
empirical evidence of trade effects. In that regard, we use the gravity model on
international trade and the difference in difference estimation method to explain the trade
effect of the EU policies towards the biotech products. Our results suggest that the
policies led to trade creation and trade diversion in some categories of the disaggregated
imports data from the rest of the World to EU.
3.2.Theory of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
The theory of trade creation and trade diversion was developed by Jacob Viner
(1950) to describe the static and the dynamic impacts of the economic integration. In the
terms of Viner, trade creation arises when the economic integration leads to a shift in
product origin from a domestic producer whose resource costs are higher to a member
producer whose resource costs are lower. According to the standard neoclassical theory,
trade creation always leads to welfare improvement as a result of the economic
integration. Trade diversion happens when the economic integration leads to a shift in
product of origin from nonmember producer whose resource costs are lower to a member
country producer whose resource costs are higher. As a result, there is a welfare reducing
consequence of the economic integration through trade diversion since the terms of trade
of the importing country decrease by the amount of the tariff revenue forgone in shifting
imports to a member country. Also, we should note that the elasticities of demand and
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supply have some effects on the terms of trade upon economic integration. Using partial
equilibrium analysis to illustrate the concepts of trade creation (Figure 3.1) and trade
diversion (Figure 3.2), we follow the textbook example (Appleyard et al, 6th edition)
where three countries A, B and C are trading partners. Country A is importing the good
from country B as well as producing it domestically prior to the formation of the
economic integration. Before the economic integration which led to the removal of tariff
among members, the price of the good in country A is $1.50 (the $ 1.00 price in country
B plus the 50 percent tariff). With the integration between A and B, the tariff is removed,
and A now imports 150 units (250units-100 units) rather than 40 units (200 units 160units) from B. Sixty units ( 160-100) of the increased imports displace previous home
production, and 50 units (250 units-200 units) reflects the greater consumption at the new
$1.00 price facing country A’s consumers. The net welfare impact is the sum of areas b
and d.
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Figure 3.1: Trade Creation and Welfare
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Figure 3.2 : Trade Diversion and Welfare
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Figure 3.2 describes the case of trade diversion. Before the union with country B, country
A has a 50 percent tariff on imports of the good. Thus country C’s tariff-inclusive price in
A’s market is $1.50, and country B’s tariff inclusive price is $1.80 (not shown). Before
the union, country A imports 50 units (180-130) from C. When the union is formed with
B, country A imports 100 units (200-100), all coming from partner B, which no longer
faces a tariff. The net welfare change for A is the difference between areas b+ d ( a
positive effect due to lower price in A) and area e ( a negative effect due to lost tariff
revenue by A that is not capture by A’s consumers). The value of the tariff revenue is
equal to the areas c and e. The area c is the part of government revenue forgone after the
integration, and it is transferred to domestic consumers through the reduction in the
domestic price. The area e is the difference in cost between the nonmember source and
the new higher-cost member source. The net effect of the economic integration between
country A and country B depends on the sum (b+d-e). This leads to ambiguity in the
case of trade diversion. In this example, welfare is reduced since the areas b+d is greater
than area e. After describing the theory of trade creation and trade diversion, we will
now test the theory in our special case.
The Case of EU trade policy towards biotech products: Non- Tariff trade barriers
In the context of this paper we define three groups of countries that trade with
each other. The European Union is considered as a group importing from the rest of the
world , BT- countries as a group of biotech adopting countries exporting their products
to EU and the non-BT countries as a group of non-biotech countries exporting their
products to EU. The restrictive trade policies of EU towards biotech countries could be
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interpreted as an import quota equivalent to some specific tariff . We assume that the EU
and non-BT countries are member of the same trading group and the BT-countries are
nonmember countries of the regional trade area. We further assume that BT countries are
the cost efficient partners where the products of origin are produced at a lower cost due to
the technology, and the non-BT countries are the cost inefficient countries without the
technology. Since EU prefers to import the non-biotech products at higher cost from the
non BT trading partner, we expect the outcome to cause trade diversion in the Vinerian
sense. In order to test our hypothesis of trade diversion of the EU trade policies, we
estimate the gravity model to provide some empirical evidence.
3.3. Theoretical Model
3.3.1. The Gravity Model

The gravity model introduced by Tinbergen (1962) has been widely used in the
literature of the international trade to measure the impact of different factors on bilateral
trade flows. The model specifies trade between two countries as a function of their
GDPs, GDPs per capita, and the geographical distance between them. Many researchers
have extended the basic gravity equation by adding other variables to test for the
influence of geographic, ethnic, linguistic, and economic conditions. The dependent
variable varies across studies depending on the purpose of the researcher. For example,
some studies use the sum of import and export flows as dependent variables (Frankel,
1997; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1997) while others consider either import or export
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flows. When it comes to the analysis of trade creation or trade diversion, most studies
choose import flows as the dependent variable (Soloaga & Winters, 2001; Fakao et al.,
2003; Clausing, 2001; Magee, 2008). In the context of this paper in which the issue of
trade creation and trade diversion is the centerpiece, we choose the import flows to
European Union from the Rest of the World as the dependent variable. The EU is treated
as one country trading with the Rest of the World. The theoretical model is defined as
follows:
(

)

(

)

[(

) (

) ]

(

)

(1)
The variables of the model are defined as follows:

Pop: population of all the countries considered and that of EU countries altogether.
The definition of distance between countries has been a controversial issue in the
literature of the gravity model of trade. Some authors used latitude and longitude data to
measure the distance, while other use the trade costs as proxies of the distance. (Bosker
and Garretsen, 2010).
In the context this paper, since EU countries are considered as one country, the
difficulty of measuring the distance arises. The distance is proxied by the average of the
ratio of imports C.I.F and exports F.O.B minus one [(cif/fop) -1] for the EU countries.
Since the gravity model of international trade uses distance to proxy transport and other
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costs associated with carrying out international transactions, the use of the ratio of C.I.F.
to F.O.B. prices may actually come closer to the spirit of the model than the simple
geographic distance between individual countries. In order to analyze the effects of
European restrictive trade policies against the biotech products on the imports of the EU
from the Rest of the World, the equation 1 is extended by including a set of dummy
variables standing for European Union trade policies against agricultural biotechnology
products, agricultural biotechnology adopting countries, and EU consumer preferences.
The policy variable is defined POL =1 in the year 2003 when the ban was more stringent
(REGULATION (EC) No 1829/2003) and 0 otherwise. The biotech countries exporting
their products to EU are considered as treated group and the remaining countries are the
control group. BT =1 for the biotech countries and 0 otherwise. The consumer
preferences are proxied by the category of the commodity groups to which the biotech
products belong.

3.3.2. The Augmented Gravity model
The hypothetical question of this paper is to determine whether the EU trade
policies against biotech products led to trade creation or trade diversion. In order to
answer this question, the augmented gravity equation defined below has been estimated.
Ten categories of commodities shown in Table 3.1 are considered in this study where the
biotech products belong to three groups of commodities: Food and Live Animals,
Beverages and Tobacco, Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats. Table 3.2 details the
specific products that belong to the three groups of commodities.
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The augmented gravity equation is defined as follows:
(

)

(

)

[(

) (

) ]

(

)

(2)
The variable k stands for commodity and t for time period (year).
Positive and significant coefficients on the parameters representing policy, BT
countries and consumer preferences are interpreted as trade in excess of what is predicted
by the gravity model and are thus considered as evidence of trade creation caused by BT
trade policies. Similarly, negative and significant coefficients on those variables are
interpreted as less trade than the predicted and are the evidence of trade diversion
(Jayasinghe and Sarker, 2007).
3.4. Data
The import data collected from the UN comtrade database are in nominal values
($US millions) and are considered as the dependent variable. The import flows of ten
categories of commodities are from 142 countries to the EU between the years 2000 and
2011. One of our goals in this study is to see the impact of EU restrictive trade policy
towards biotech products on the import flows from the biotech Countries. Among the
biotech Countries, US and China have extremely high imports flows to EU. For example,
the coefficient on BT dummy when US and China are include in the data is 30.44216.
That is, the import flows increase by 3044% from biotech Countries to EU. In contrast,
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dropping US and China from the dataset, the coefficient on BT is 0.090 which means that
there is 9% increase of import flows from biotech Countries to EU. The main reason US
and China are dropped from the dataset is that the dummy variable BT is just capturing
the imports of these countries to EU. The GDP and population data are collected from the
World Bank. The distance is proxied by the average of the ratio of imports C.I.F and
exports F.O.B minus one [(cif/fop) -1] for the EU countries. There were some missing
values from year 2009 to 2011 for some countries and these values were replaced with
extrapolated values. All the gravity variables are presented in logarithm. The biotech
products belong to three categories of the commodities: Food and Live Animals,
Beverages and Tobacco, and Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats. These categories are
shown in the disaggregated commodities data presented in Table 3.1 below. The other
variables are represented by dummies. The data is organized as unbalanced panel set.
Import flows, the product of GDPs, the product of per capita GDPs, and distance
are in logarithmic form, and they are summarized in Table 3.3 below. The other
variables are all dummies. With 142 countries, 10 categories of commodities, and 12
years of observations, there should be 17,040 observations. However, because of missing
data, we instead estimate an unbalanced panel set with 15,654 observations. The
variables import flows, product of GDPs, product of per capita GDP, and distance are all
measured in millions of US dollars between 2000 and 2011.
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3.5. Estimation and Results
The augmented gravity model described in Equation (2) is estimated using the method of
pooled OLS. The results presented in Table 3.4 show positive and significant coefficients
for the product of GDPs and GDP per capita. The coefficients for distance for the
alternative regressions are significant and negative. These results are in line with the
theory of the gravity model. Given the purpose of our study, we add BT countries fixed
effects to capture time invariant shocks like other trade agreement between EU and BT
countries as well as interaction BT Countries –year fixed effects to control for any other
things that might affect imports to the EU. Equation 2 was separately estimated first
without any specific fixed effects, then controlling for BT countries, and finally
controlling for BT countries-year. The results for the three regressions are reported sideby-side in Table 3.4 below. From the results of the first estimation, the coefficient on BT
variable is positive and significant but since the fixed effects terms are excluded, any
other trade flows between BT countries and EU were not being controlled. In the second
regression, BT variable was dropped since BT countries fixed effects are included in the
regressions because the presence of the two variables has caused a dummy trap. In the
third regression, since both BT countries fixed effects and BT countries –year fixed
effects are included; every other things that might affect trade between EU and BT
countries are being controlled. As a result, the estimation results from the third
regressions are relatively unbiased compared to the first two.

54

The interpretation of the parameter estimates (γs and αs) follows the approach of
Halvorsen and Palmquist, who calculated the percentage effect of the dummy variables.
For example, assuming that the coefficient estimate of the BT dummy variable in
equation (2) is γ1, the result shows that BT countries traded an extra {exp (γ1)-1} x 100%
with EU relative to the amount non-BT country traded with EU. Similarly, if the
estimated coefficient, γ2 is negative, it shows that BT countries traded {exp (-γ2) -1}
x100% less with EU relative to the amount traded with non-BT country traded with EU.
The equivalent dollar value of each estimated coefficients are calculated and presented in
Table 3.5 by multiplying the percentage changes by imports mean.
The interpretation of the estimated coefficients on commodities has served to
provide an idea of the impact of EU preferences of the agricultural biotechnology.
Likewise, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients on policy variable was used to
provide the impact of the EU restrictive policy on import flows from the rest of the
World. The estimation results show trade creation in the category of Food and Live
Animals. In other words, there is on average 77.89% increase in imports flows for Food
and Live Animals from the rest of World to EU. Furthermore, the estimate of the policy
variable is negative, but it cannot be considered as evidence of trade diversion since it is
not statistically significant. Trade diversion was found in the categories of Beverages and
Tobacco, and Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats, where the imports flows decrease on
average by 72.17% in the former category and by 74.00% in the latter category. Without
considering BT countries and BT countries-year fixed effects, trade creation was found
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for BT countries. This could be explained by the fact that EU has other different form of
trade relationship with the BT countries, which has nothing to do with the fact that these
countries adopted the agricultural biotechnology. The estimated coefficient for the
interaction term (BT*Policy), which is negative in the first estimation result suggests that
EU trade policies on biotech products from the treated groups (BT countries) has caused
a decrease in the import flows. The estimated coefficients from the second and third
regressions suggest that the EU policy on biotech increases imports between EU and BT
countries by 1.79% and 15.49% respectively. However, since these coefficients are not
statistically significant, this does not constitute evidence of trade creation. In addition,
the coefficient of the policy variable is negative in all the three estimation results. Based
on the estimated results from the third regression, the import flows have decreased by
2.96% due to BT policy, but this estimate of the coefficient of the policy variable is not
significant.
In order the link the estimation results to the theory of trade creation and trade
diversion, we follow Jayasinghe and Sarker, 2007 to compute the dollar value
corresponding to each estimated coefficient by multiplying the mean value of total
imports flows for each category of commodities by its percentage change. The estimated
coefficients were taken from the third estimation results in Table 3.4 because the
estimation results from the third regressions are relatively unbiased compared to the first
two. According to the results in Table 3.5 below, the EU could have imported 782.294
millions of dollars of beverages and tobacco from the rest of the World at lower costs if
EU consumers had not pushed their governments to reject biotech products. Similarly, the
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EU could have imported 831.018 millions of dollars Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats
from the rest of the World at lower costs. An additional 2836.946 millions of dollars of
Food and Live Animals has been imported from the rest of the world despite consumers’
negative attitudes towards biotech products.
3.6. Conclusion
The results show that the impact of EU consumer preferences proxied by three categories
of commodities had a significant impact on imports between EU and the rest of the
World. Furthermore, these preferences led to trade diversion in the categories of
Beverages and Tobacco and that of Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats. In contrast,
trade creation was found in the category of Food and Live Animals. The coefficient of
the policy variable is negative but not statistically significant. Therefore, this cannot be
considered as evidence of either trade creation or trade diversion.
In sum, the augmented gravity model has enabled us to measure the impact of the
EU’s restrictive trade policies on trade creation and trade diversion. However, since the
coefficient estimates of the policy variable are not significant in this study, further
analysis is called for. Further influences on trade must be incorporated into the models,
and alternative data must be used. Also, in this study the product categories are rather
broad. The data should be further disaggregated in order to better distinguish the policy’s
effects.
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Table 3.1: Disaggregated Commodities Data
Category Code

Commodity Description

S1-0

Food and live animals

S1-1

Beverages and tobacco

S1-2

Crude materials, inedible, except fuels

S1-3

Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials

S1-4

Animal and vegetable oils and fats

S1-5

Chemicals

S1-6

Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material

S1-7

Machinery and transport equipment

S1-8

Miscellaneous manufactured articles

S1-9

Commod. & transacts. Not classified. Accord. To kind

Source: UN Comtrade
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Table 3.2: Category of Commodities with Biotech Products
Commodity
Category
Food and Live
Animals

Beverages and
Tobacco
Animal and
Vegetable Oils
and Fats

E.U. Trade Restrictions per products

Status

-Tomatoes: Puree made from GM tomatoes
is not approved by EU.
-Sugar beet: Cultivation of GM sugar beet in
the EU is not expected before 2015.
-Rapeseed: For the time being, no GM
rapeseed is grown in Europe.
-Food produced from MON1445 cotton
(cp4 epsps gene inserted to confer tolerance
to the herbicide glyphosate)
-Food additives produced from MON1445
cotton
-Feed produced from GMO bacteria:
“bacteria biomass”
-Feed materials produced from GMO yeast :
“ yeast biomass”
-maize (Bt176) and its derived products

Authorization
expired 12/18/2011
Renewal of
authorization
ongoing
Renewal of
authorization
ongoing
withdrawn

Derived products
-oilseed rape (GT73)
-oilseed rape ( T45)
-oil swede-rape (MS8, RF3, MS8xRF3)
-hybrid oilseed rape ( MS1xRF1)
-hybrid oilseed rape and Topas ( MS1xRF2)
-Derived products

Sources: European Commission Website

Renewal of
authorization
ongoing
withdrawn
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Log of Imports Flows
Log of Product of GDPs
Log of Product of per Capita
GDP
Log of Distance
Food and live animals
Beverages and tobacco
Animal and Vegetable Oils and
Fats
BT countries
Policy
BT*Policy

N
15654
15654
15654
16454
15654
15654
15654
15654
15654
15654

Mean
6.885
16.638
13.786
-0.313
0.107
0.096
0.075
0.188
0.083
0.015

Std Dev
1.737
0.879
0.662
0.030
0.310
0.295
0.264
0.390
0.276
0.124

Min
0.954
13.323
0.00
-0.370
0
0
0
0
0
0

Max
16.913
18.911
15.425
-0.269
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
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Table 3.4: Estimation Results
Variables
Coef. (1)
Intercept
-27.86
Product of GDPs
1.111
Product of per Capita GDP
1.166
Distance
-1.129
Food and live animals
0.576
Beverages and tobacco
-1.280
Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats
-1.342
BT countries
0.083
Policy
-0.014
BT*Policy
-0.067
BT countries Fixed Effects
NO
BT countries-year Fixed Effects
NO
N =15664

R2 =

0.47

S.E.
0.39
0.013
0.017
0.155
0.032
0.034
0.038
0.031
0.041
0.093

T-stat Coef (2)
-71.40
-28.47
82.20
1.127
68.07
1.191
-7.27
-1.174
17.57
0.577
-37.09
-1.280
-34.80
-1.347
2.66
-----0.34
-0.029
-0.73
0.0177
YES
NO
0.48

S.E.
0.391
0.013
0.017
0.154
0.032
0.034
0.038
-----0.041
0.091

T-stat Coef (3)
-72.81
-27.62
83.12
1.103
67.93
1.156
-7.60
-1.297
17.71
0.576
-37.37
-1.279
-35.17
-1.347
-------------0.72
-0.030
0.19
0.144
YES
YES
0.47

S.E.
0.429
0.014
0.019
0.172
0.032
0.034
0.038
------0.042
0.398

T-stat
-60.25
76.07
60.83
-7.54
17.61
-37.16
-34.98
-------0.72
0.36
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Table 3.5: Trade Effect of EU Consumers Biotech Preferences
Variables
Food & Live
Animals
Beverages and
Tobacco
Animal and
vegetables Oils
and Fats

Estimated
Coef.
0.576
-1.279
-1.347

Percentage
Changes
77.89%

Imports
Mean

Equivalent
US dollar
2836.946

-72.17%

3642.208
1077.530

-777.636

-74.00%

1123.027

-831.018

Trade
Effect
Trade
Creation
Trade
Diversion
Trade
Diversion
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CHAPTER 4
SHOULD THE SOUTH AND EU ADOPT THE AGRICULTURAL
BIOTECHNOLOGY? GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY

Abstract: Ongoing debates about the adoption of the agricultural biotechnology in the
developing countries and EU have dominated the literature in development economics
and biosciences. The current literature emphasizes more current positive aspects of the
technology without taking into account the effects of the enforcement of the Intellectual
Property Rights, consumers’ preferences and the negative externalities which include
environmental and social related issues. The goal of this paper is to account for such
factors using a general equilibrium approach and comparative statics analysis to
determine the impact of the enforcement of the IPRs, consumers’ preferences and
externalities on the production of biotech crops. The results show that efficient
production of biotech crops under the influence of the three factors mentioned above is
contingent upon several parameters of the model. These parameters include output
elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech productions, total factor productivity
in biotech production, and the ratio of the proportions of the biotech and non-biotech
products consumed by each consumer. From the economic standpoint, any country that is
envisioning in adopting the agricultural biotech should consider the impact of these
parameters on the efficient production without ignoring the reality that surrounds the
technology itself.
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4.1. Introduction and Background

Private firms in North America came up with new technology to create seeds that
are more resistant to insects, drought, weeds etc. This innovative step not only increases
yields and reduces the amount of insecticides used, but it also has the property of damage
control. Moreover, the technology provides environmental benefits to countries by
increasing production while reducing the use of chemicals, pesticides, and herbicides
(Haghiri and Philips, 2003). Some people and corporations suggest that the agricultural
biotechnology is known in the current century as the only way to assure food security in
the developing world where the population is growing faster than the food supplies. It
means that the rate of increase in the world food supplies cannot match the rate of the
population growth (Haghiri and Philips, 2003). This argument is very controversial in the
sense that it may not even be true for some specific countries because the nutrition
system for each country is very different as well as the agricultural policies. Despite some
positive features of the agricultural biotechnology, farmers in the developing countries
are still reluctant in adopting it, and consumers are very cautious about the biotech
products due to health, cultural, ethical and moral concerns. The major reasons of the
delay in the adoption of the agricultural biotech in some developing countries and EU are
explained in the following lines.
First, the technology is expensive for the impoverished farmers with little working
capital because of the enforcement of the IPRs. In other words, in addition to seed costs,
seed companies charge farmers a technology fee. As a result, the seeds become more
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expensive for farmers who may end up bankrupt mostly in the presence of some
uncertainty due to new emerging pests, random weather conditions and even some
market distortions. Since the technology is owned by the private seed industry, often
protected by the intellectual property rights, many varieties have become expensive and
practically inaccessible to poverty-stricken farmers in Africa (Black et al., 2011). High
seed costs due to the enforcement of IPRs have some indirect social impacts as well.
Cotton cultivation in India has been plagued with rising costs of cultivation, ineffective
pesticides, adulterated seeds and other factors leading to consecutive crop failures, and
heavy indebtedness has led to suicides by farmers (Lalitha, 2007). For example, “For
farmers such as Vithal Bhindarwa, however, investing in BT cottonseeds did not lead to
economic security. Hoping to provide a better life for his wife and children, Bhindarwa
purchased these higher-priced seeds through loans in excess of Rs. 28,000 [US$566 in
2008] both from the State bank and from private moneylenders. When his crop failed in
2008 as a result of unpredictable weather conditions, Bhindarwa was unable to pay back
his loans and took his own life by swallowing rat poison, leaving his 22-year-old son,
Gajanan, as the head of the family. Bhindarwa’s story is not uncommon: for too many
farmers, investing in BT cottonseeds has not led to greater financial security, but has
instead contributed to their financial distress. The reason, as explained below, is that BT
cottonseeds demand even more of two resources that are already scarce for many
farmers: money and water” (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice and
International Human Rights Clinic, 2011). The financial distress is worst for the farmers
with very small plots of land, who have to deal with a great deal of yield uncertainty and
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at the same time incurring high seed costs. Moreover, one could argue that the
enforcement of the IRPs is to promote innovation in agricultural but it turned out to be
more rent –seeking behavior as private investment becomes heavily higher than public
investment. For example, private investment in biotechnology research is far ahead of
public investment in developed countries ($5 billion), although public investment in
biotechnology ($125 million) with the purpose of benefiting the farmers and consumers is
increasing in developing countries (Qaim, 2001). Strong enforcement of the IPRs enable
these companies to not only recover their costs, but also to increase profits by capturing
much of the surplus generated by the predicted productivity gains. However, the
introduction of new seeds can be harmful to farmers because developing new seeds is not
enough and other aspects of the agriculture in the developing countries such as land
policies, research policies, transfer of the technology, and the acceptance of GMOs
techniques should be considered.
The enforcement of the IPRs was supported by WTO through the establishment of
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) at Uruguay Round
negotiations of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Developed countries
managed to negotiate the TRIPS agreement in spite of strong opposition from developing
countries (Braga, 1995). Gaisford et al. (2002) suggest that in the context of
biotechnology, it is not in the self-interest of producers in developing countries to respect
intellectual property rights. Gaisford et al. (2007) using game theory approach and under
certain assumptions, found that the TRIPS will not provide sufficient incentive for
developing countries to protect intellectual property rights in biotechnology. Given that
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the enforcement of the IPRs in the context of biotechnology is more harmful to famers
than any other stakeholders. Haghiri and Philips (2003) suggest a model for regional
intellectual property rights for developing countries especially Iran where individual IPRs
are not enforceable. They found that the concept of regional- intellectual property rights
would be more beneficial for neighboring countries and there should be joint
contributions to R& D in the biotechnology sector which could yield real benefits. In sum,
the enforcement of the Intellectual Property Rights supported by WTO through TRIPS
and implemented by the seed companies through the charge of the technology fees on
biotech seeds had become a heavy financial burden for farmers in developing countries.
As a consequence, poor farmers with small plots of land might be better off growing
conventional crops than biotech crops at the presence of the enforcement of the IRPs by
private seeds companies.
The second reason of the delay of the adoption of Agricultural biotech is
consumers’ preferences. Consumers preferences towards biotech product significantly
depend on the information disseminated about the products. There are two main sources
of information on the biotech products and these sources are contentious. The fact that
these two or many more sources of information on the biotech products conflict with each
other, consumers preferences have become more convoluted in the sense that consumers
have to evaluate the accuracy of any information before they can make purchasing
decision. Also, we should note that strong economic interests are tied up in GMO seeds.
In other words, the issue of trust comes into play in consumers purchasing decisions
about the biotech products. For example, the agricultural biotech firms are claiming that
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GMO crops will lower food costs worldwide and improve environmental quality
(Huffman et al., 2004). Moreover, they have touted the use of biotechnology to create
new products as major source of revolution in product innovation (Hoban 1997, 2001).
However, two environmental NGOs Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have provided
evidence that raises the possibility of risks to human health, environment, and
biodiversity. Given that controversy around the products, consumers in every country are
cautious. Some countries require labeling of GMOs products and others reject the
products as a whole. Consumers’ preferences vary across countries, geographic areas
within Europe, and cultures. US consumers are more inclined towards GMO products
than EU consumers because the perception of risks associated with biotechnology and
overall awareness of biotechnology are somewhat lower among US consumers.
Acceptance of the technology in the US is slightly higher (Hanitios, 2000). In Europe,
Southern countries tend to accept biotechnology, while Northern countries are more
cautious. The remarkable exceptions are the Netherlands and Finland, which are both
strongly in favor of biotechnology. In contrast, the Dutch are the most concerned about
the potential risks involved (Zechendorf, 1998). Economic concerns, moral, ethical
concerns are equally raised to address the issue of the consumer preferences towards
biotech products. Cost- benefit analysis has been performed to determine the economic
impact of the use of GMOs on consumers. Suppose that the price of GMOs crop drop,
then the consumer will choose to consume more of that good and, consumer welfare or
utility will increase (Hoban, 1996c; Moschini et al., 1999). Similarly, if the technology
leads the prices of GM crops to increase, consumer welfare or utility will decrease
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(Giannakos and Fulton, 2000). Some consumers due to their religious beliefs consider the
fact that the technology brings change in the processes of natural life of the seeds, are
reluctant in accepting GM crops (Huffman et al., 2004).
Finally, negative externalities generated by the technology are causing delay in
the adoption of the technology in EU and the developing countries. Biotech seeds create
some negative externalities through the proliferation of secondary pests. For example,
Bollworm populations are the main target of the technology; however while using biotech
seeds which produce toxins designed to kill bollworms, farmers still have to spray some
pesticides. The use of biotech seeds reduces the amount of pesticides sprayed because of
the toxins produced by the seeds. For example, for the years 2000 and 2001, BT cotton
was associated with 55 percent reduction in pesticide for the average Chinese farm (Pray
et al. 2002). As a result, by reducing the amount of pesticides, farmers may have
unintentionally created a safe haven for other pests not affected by BT technology (Wang
et al., 2006). This phenomenon is called a pest externality, which occurs when the
chemicals or the technology used to target one pest inadvertently increase the
concentration of and damage from secondary pest. Pest externalities will affect not only
the output of biotech crops, but also farmers’ decision whether to adopt the technology or
not. Unfortunately crop damage is still endemic despite the use of biotech seeds and
pesticides. The biotech seeds that were claimed to be very successful in resisting pests
have some limits, and this is one of the reasons farmers in the developing world are still
hesitant in adopting the technology. The main objective of this paper is to determine the
impact of the enforcement of the intellectual property rights, consumers’ preferences, and

71

pest externality on the change in the output of biotech crops. Whether farmers will adopt
the technology or not has something to do with their knowledge about the impact of these
three factors on the output.

Our model considers only a small part of the issues

concerning the agricultural biotechnology. Our analysis is based on the adoption decision
of farmers in the developing countries and EU taking into account these three factors
mentioned above. Also we should note that, these factors are usually overlooked in the
evaluation of the biotech seeds. Our model includes only farmers and consumers and did
not consider the seeds companies, biotech products markets, and the research
development sector. The theoretical model accounting for these factors is described
below.
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4.2.Theoretical Model

4.2.1 General Equilibrium and Efficiency
Consider an economy with two individuals (BT consumers and Non-BT
consumers), two firms (BT producers and Non-BT producers) and two goods (BT
products and Non-BT products). In order for the South and EU to adopt the technology,
the efficiency conditions need to be satisfied. As a result efficiency in exchange,
efficiency in production and efficiency in the output market must all be solved for.
4.2.1.1 Efficiency in exchange
Efficiency of exchange is satisfied when the MRS1= MRS2. In order to achieve
that efficiency, consumer 2 maximizes its utility (U2) subject to that of Consumer 1 (U1).
The consumers have both BT and non-BT products in their consumption bundle. In order
to get clear idea of the degree of substitution between BT and non-BT products for each
consumer, we consider CES utility function for consumer 1 and consumer 2 (Arrow et
al., 1961). The degree of substitution will be used to determine the level of preferences
of BT and non-BT products for each consumer. For example, if consumer 1 prefers BT to
non-BT and consumer 2 prefers non-BT to BT, the elasticities of substitution of
consumer 1 will be greater than that of consumer 2.
The utility functions of each consumer are defined as follow:


 1/ 
U1( X 1 , Y1 )  [ ( X 1 )   (Y1 ) ]
bt nbt
1 bt
2 nbt
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U 2 ( X 2 , Y 2 )  [ ( X 2 )   (Y 2 ) ]1/ 
bt nbt
1 bt
2 nbt
U1 and U2 are the utilities functions of the consumer 1 and consumer2, respectively.

X 1 and Y 1 are consumer 1’s consumptions of biotech and non-biotech, respectively.
bt
nbt
X 2 and Y 2 are consumer 2’s consumptions of biotech and non-biotech, respectively.
bt
nbt
X

bt

and Y
are the outputs of biotech and non-biotech products in the economy.
nbt

In this closed economy model, we assume that the total production of biotech is
consumed among the two consumers as well as the total production of non-biotech.
Therefore the constraint equations are expressed as follow:

X1  X 2  X
Y1  Y 2  Y
bt
bt
bt ; nbt nbt nbt
Setting up the maximization problem we have:

2

2 2 )
bt nbt

Max U ( X ; Y

1
1
1
1
Subject to U ( X bt ; Ynbt )  U 0

1
2
X bt1  X bt2  X bt ; Ynbt
 Ynbt
 Ynbt

Setting the Lagragian we have:
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
L  U ( X bt ; Ynbt )  [ U 10 - U ( X bt ;Ynbt )]  bt ( X bt  X bt  X bt )  nbt (Ynbt  Ynbt  Ynbt )

Solving the first order conditions (FOCs), we end up with:
U 1x U x2 bt


U 1y U y2 nbt
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1  X bt1 
1 
 2  Ynbt


 1

 X2 
 1  2bt 
 2  Ynbt 

 1

(1)

X1  a X ; X 2  a X
bt
1 bt bt
2 bt (2)
1
2
Y
 b Y ;Y
b Y
nbt
1 nbt nbt
2 nbt

The coefficients a1and a2 are the proportions of BT products consumed by consumer 1
and consumer 2, respectively; b1 and b2 are the proportions of non-BT products
consumed by consumer 1 and consumer 2, respectively. Plugging (2) into (1) we have:

1  a1 X bt 
 2  b1Ynbt 

 1

 a X 
 1  2 bt 
 2  b2Ynbt 

 1

i 

The efficiency in exchange (Pareto efficiency allocation) holds at MRS1=MRS2 which
implies both consumers lie on the contract curve in the Edgeworth box. In other words,
the Pareto efficient bundle is determined at the mutual tangency of consumer1’s and
consumer2‘s indifference curves in the Edgeworth box along the contract curve. These
are the bundles at which consumer1’s and consumer 2’s marginal rate of substitution are
equal.
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4.2.1.2. Efficiency in Production
The production function of the agricultural biotech products is defined by
considering the fact that there is knowledge spillover from the North to the South. That
is, the developing countries use the technology developed by the North American private
companies (Monsanto, Syngenta etc.) to produce their agricultural products. Since these
private companies are profit maximizing agents, they charged farmers the technology fee
for the first time use of the seed. Therefore, we defined p (i) as the regular price of seeds
Xbt (i) and T the technology fee. The expression AS  ZAN depicts the technology transfer
S
N
from the North to the South. A and A are the stock of knowledge in the South and the

stock of knowledge in the North, respectively. In the South we have both producers of
BT and non-BT crops.
Following Either (1982), the production function in the South for the BT
producing sectors is defined as follow:
∫
{

(3)
(4)

represents other inputs such as insecticides, fertilizers, manure, and land used in the
biotech sector in the South.

is the parameter representing a variety of externalities such

as new pest density, the effect of the insecticides on the ground water (in addition to the
biotech seed, farmers still have to use some insecticides). These externalities could be
considered as decreasing productivity factors in the production of Biotech crops.
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The coefficient 1- bL is the fraction of labor used in the biotech producing sector,
while the coefficient bL is the fraction of labor used in the non-biotech producing sector.
The expression (4) implies that biotech seeds

is the amount of capital good i that is

used and it is a proportion of the stock of knowledge in the South. This production
function is considered as a production function of a representative farmer in the biotech
producing sector of a country adopting the technology. Farmers produce a final product
by combining human labor, insecticides, fertilizers, manure, and land with different types
of seeds

, where i ϵ [0,A]. The additive separability of

is a crucial property

of this production function. It implies that the discoveries of new seeds do not make any
existing seeds obsolete (Papageorgiou, 2000). For example, the biotech seeds that are
insects resistant will still be used by farmers when drought resistant seeds are discovered.
In other words, every type of seeds is necessary for the production of biotech products at
country level. Under conditions of prefect competition, the potential gains from seeds
innovation are shared among seeds companies, farmers, consumers and others. As for the
seeds companies, they earn the technology fee T, in addition to the regular seed prices.
Farmers find their output increase due the damage control property of the seeds and also
a reduction in the insectides use. The benefits that go to consumers are very unclear due
to the influence of consumers’ preferences of biotech products.
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The production function of non-BT producers which follows Cobb-Douglas
specification is defined as follow:
(5)

G Y
 K  L1  Z
nbt
nbt nbt nbt
We assume constant returns to scale. The difference between biotech and nonbiotech production functions is that the former is the extended form of the latter. The
non-biotech production function excludes the externalities, technology spillover, and also
the capital used is not tied to any stock of knowledge.
For simplicity we assume     0 , and then after some algebra the production
function of BT producers becomes:

1 
F  Y  B1   (1  b ) ZAN L 
K

bt
L
bt 
bt

(6)

In order to attain efficiency in production we step up the maximization problem as
follow:
Maximize:

1 
Y  B1   (1  b ) ZAN L 
K

bt
L
bt 
bt
Subject to:

Y
 K  L1  
nbt
nbt nbt
L L
 L; K  K
K
bt
nbt
bt
nbt
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  B1 (1  bL )ZAN Lbt  K bt  [ Yn b t 1

 1
K nbt
Lnbt ]  L L  Lbt  Lnbt   k K  Kbt  K nbt 

From the FOCs, we end up with:

FL GL L


(7 )
FK GK K
Equation (7) corresponds to MRTSbt=MRTSnbt, where the efficiency in production is
achieved. After rearranging (7) the production efficiency will be satisfied under the
following condition:
1

1 
ii 
k 
k
bt

 nbt

The variables

k bt and k n b t

are the capital labor ratio used in biotech and non-biotech

production, respectively.  is the biotech output elasticity of capital and  is the nonbiotech output elasticity of capital.
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4.2.1.3. Efficiency in the output Market
In this case the condition MRT=MRS1 =MRS2 need to be satisfied for the market
to be efficient. Since we have already determined the marginal rate of substitutions
(MRS) from the consumer problem, we now have to determine the marginal rate of
transformation (MRT), which is the ratio of marginal cost of producing BT products to
the marginal cost of producing non-BT products. Let us find the marginal cost of BT
from the cost minimization problem.
Minimize:
AS



C  wL Lbt  ( wK  T )  X bt (i ) di
i 0

Subject .to :



F  Ybt  B1 (1  bL ) ZAN Lbt



1

K bt



L  wL Lbt  ( wK  T )  X bt (i) di  bt{Ybt  B1 (1  bL ) ZAN Lbt  K bt }
AS

1

i 0



L  wL Lbt  (wK  T ) K  As1  bt {Ybt  B1 (1  bL )ZAN Lbt



1

K bt }

From the FOCs, we have:

wL K bt 1 AS1 ( wK  T )
bt 

FL
FK
Furthermore, according to the envelope theorem we have:

L C ( wL , wK , Ybt )

 bt
Ybt
Ybt
The constant term bt is the marginal cost of producing BT products.
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bt 

bt 

(1   ) B

1

wL
(a)

[(1  bL ) ZA N ]1 Lbt K bt

K bt 1 AS1 ( wK  T )

B1 [(1  bL ) ZA N ]1 L1bt K bt 1

(b)

Let us find the marginal cost of non-BT products from the Cost minimization problem.
Minimize:

C  wL Lnbt  wK K nbt
Subject to:
 1
G  Ynbt  K nbt
LG

From the FOCs, we have:

nbt 

wL wK

GL GK

The marginal cost of producing non-BT products is nbt

nbt 

wL
(c )
(1   )(k nbt )

nbt 

wK
(d )
 (k nbt ) 1

We assume that the price of labor ( wL ) is identical in the production of BT and non-BT
products, but the price of capital ( wK ) is not identical in the production of BT and non-BT
products. That is:

wL bt  wLnbt  wL ,
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and
r= wk + T.
The capital labor ratios on BT products and non-BT products are defined as follow:

kbt 

K bt
K
; k nbt  nbt
Lbt
Lnbt

Taking the ratio of the marginal cost of the two products, we have:


(a)
(1   ) B 1
N  1 k nbt
 MRTL  bt 
[(1  bL ) ZA ]
(c )
nbt
(1   )
kbt

 1

B 1K bt 1 ( wk  T )(1  bL ) 1 knbt
(b)
 MRTK  bt 
(d )
nbt
wK
kbt 1

Therefore, for efficiency in the output market we should have MRT= MRS1=MRS2
That is:

k
 a X 
(1   ) B  1
MRTL  MRS1 
[(1  bL ) ZA N ] 1 nbt
 1  1 bt 

(1   )
k bt  2  b1Ynbt 

 1

, (iii )

 1

 1
B 1Kbt 1 ( wk  T )(1  bL ) 1 knbt
1  a2 X bt 
MRTK  MRS 2 


 , (iv )
wK (bL ) 1
kbt 1  2  b2Ynbt 

Under the assumptions of the model, which include the presence of externalities, the
enforcement of the IPRs, and consumers’ preferences, EU and developing economies
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using the agricultural biotechnology developed by the North American private firms,
should consider the general equilibrium efficiency conditions to make sure that the
adoption of agricultural biotechnology would lead to efficiency in the entire economy.
That is, MRS must be equal for all consumers, MRTS must be equal for all farmers,
and MRT must be equal to MRS for all consumers.
4.2.1.4. General equilibrium Efficiency Conditions

 a X 
1  1 bt 
MRS1= MRS2 
 b Y 
2  1 nbt 

 1

 1
 a X 
i 
 1  2 bt 
 b Y 
2  2 nbt 

1
1 
MRTSbt=MRTSnbt 
ii 
k 
k
 bt
 nbt

MRTL  MRS1 

MRTK  MRS 2

( I)

 1
k
 a X 
(1   ) B  1
N


1
nbt  1  1 bt 
[(1  b ) ZA ]
, (iii )
L
(1   )
 b Y 
k
2  1 nbt 
bt

 1
B  1K   1( w  T )(1  b )  1 k   1   a X 
bt
k
L
nbt  1  2 bt 
, (iv )

 1  b Y 
w
k
K
2  2 nbt 
bt

4.2.2 Comparative Statics
4.2.2.1 Comparative Statics on the Technology fee, T
The idea is to evaluate the impact of the enforcement of the IPRs in the
developing countries, when the seed companies charged farmers for the technology. The
impact is measured by looking at the change in the production of biotech and non-biotech
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products with respect to the technology fee. Since the fee is charged for the first time use
of the seed, we have conducted comparative statics analysis. One can argue, as we did in
the introduction to this paper, that, despite the fact that the technology fee is paid for the
first time use it might have some dynamic impact on production. However, since we are
dealing with a short term model, we choose to conduct static analysis. The first step to
conduct the comparative statics is to linearize the system (I) by taking log of both sides.
The system becomes:

A  (   1) ln X  (1   ) ln Y
 A  (  1) ln X  (1   ) ln Y
1
bt
nbt
2
bt
nbt
B  ln k  B  ln k
1
bt
2
nbt
ln K   ln k
  ln k  A  (   1) ln X  (1   ) ln Y
1
nbt
bt
1
bt
nbt
ln K  (  1) ln k
 (1   ) ln k  A  (  1) ln X  (1   ) ln Y .
2
nbt
bt
2
bt
nbt
  1


a
 1  a1 

1  (   1) ln 1
A  ln 

ln

1
 b 

b
2
1
 2  1 

(II )


1



a
 1  a2 

1  (  1) ln 2
A  ln 

ln

2
 b 

b
2
2
 2  2 

1   
B  ln 
1
  
1   
B  ln 

2
  
1    B  1  1  b ZA N   1
K 
1 (1   )
L





K 
2



B  1K   1( w  T )(1  b )  1
bt

k
w
K

L
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Then, keeping the endogenous variables on the left hand side and sending the exogenous
variables to the right hand side, we have:
(    ) ln X

bt

 (   ) ln Y
A A
nbt
2
1

ln k  ln k
B B
bt
nbt
2
1
(III )

(1   ) ln X
(1   ) ln X

bt

 (   1) ln Y
  ln k   ln k
 A  ln K
nbt
bt
nbt
1
1

bt

 (  1) ln Y
 (1   ) ln k  (  1) ln k
 A  ln K
nbt
bt
nbt
2
2

The system (III ) can be expressed as the following implicit functions:

F1(ln X , ln Y , ln k , ln k , ln K , ln K , A , A , B , B , T ,  , ,  )  0
bt
nbt
bt
nbt
1
2 1 2 1 2
F 2 (ln X , ln Y , ln k , ln k , ln K , ln K , A , A , B , B , T ,  , ,  )  0
bt
nbt
bt
nbt
1
2 1 2 1 2
3
F (ln X , ln Y , ln k , ln k , ln K , ln K , A , A , B , B , T ,  , ,  )  0
bt
nbt
bt
nbt
1
2 1 2 1 2
4
F (ln X , ln Y , ln k , ln k , ln K , ln K , A , A , B , B , T ,  , ,  )  0
bt
nbt
bt
nbt
1
2 1 2 1 2

(III )

To determine the impact of a change in the technology fee on the optimal values
of the endogenous variables, we take the total derivative of each of the four functions of
the System (III ) with respect to T.
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  ln X bt 
0
0
       



  T  0


   ln Y  

nbt  0
0

0
1 1



  T  0



   ln k
 

(1   )

bt   1 
(   1)   

  T
 w T 



  K
(1   )
   ln knbt 


(


1
)
1


(


1
)


 T 
  ln X bt 
1
0
0


        
 0

 T  




  ln Y

0
nbt


0
0
1

1




 0

 T   
 
  ln k
 

  1 
bt  (1   )
(   1)   

 w T 
 T
 

  K

  ln k



nbt

 (1   )
(  1) 1    (  1)
 T 

J  2(    )1     1     1  0

Using the method of Cramer the solutions of the system are:

 ln X
T

bt 

 
2( w  T )[(1   )(  1)   (  1)]
K

 ln Y
 ln k
 
nbt 
bt  0
;
T
2( w  T )[(1   )(  1)   (  1)]
T
K

 ln k

nbt  0
T
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4.2.2.2 Comparative Statics on Consumer Preferences,  and



To determine the impact of a change in the consumers preferences on the optimal
values of the endogenous variables, we take the total derivative of each of the four
functions of the System (III ) with respect to  and  .
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4.2.2.3 Comparative Statics on externalities,



To determine the impact of a change in the externalities on the optimal values of
the endogenous variables, we take the total derivative of each of the four functions of the
System (III ) with respect to
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4.2.3 Discussion of the Conclusions of the Model
The results from this model can be applied to several developing countries
depending on how the production of the agricultural biotechnology is affected by the
enforcement of the property rights (technology fee), consumer preferences and the
externalities. Since our model is set up to cover only the production of biotech products,
our discussion only distinguishes the impact of the technology fee, consumer preferences
and externalities on the biotech crops production. The Summary of the results of the
model for the biotech crops production is presented in Table 4.1 below.

4.2.3.1 Impact of the technology fee
The model predicts that the impact of the technology fee charged by the private
seed companies on the production of the biotech products depends on several factors:
the biotech output elasticity of capital ( ) , the non-biotech output elasticity of capital (
 ) ,the preferences ( and ρ) of the two consumers considered in the economy, and the

costs ( wK  T ) of the biotech seeds.
4.2.3.2 The Impact of the Elasticity of Supply of Capital
For one thing, we see that if non-biotech output elasticity of capital is lower than
biotech output elasticity of capital (    ), any change in the technology fee will
positively affect the production of biotech products. In other words, if we can assume
that the output elasticity of capital in the biotech production is higher, then an increase in
the technology fee will increase the output of the biotech crops. That is, biotech
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producers will increase their production because the contribution of capital to the biotech
output is higher despite the technology fee.
In order to grasp the intuition behind this case, let us assume =0.35 and θ=0.65.
That is, a 1 percent increase in the use of capital would lead to 0.35 percent increase in
the non-biotech production and 0.65 percent increase in the biotech production.
Therefore, given that condition, producers of biotech crops could increase their
production with an increase in the technology fee, and vice versa. In contrast, if nonbiotech output elasticity of capital is greater than biotech output elasticity of capital
(    ), any change in the technology fee will negatively affect the production of biotech
products.
4.2.3.3 Impact of the Consumers Preferences
For any country to adopt the technology, we need to make sure that consumers
would appreciate the products and buy them. In our model, the production of the biotech
products by any country should consider the impact of consumers’ preferences. As you
can recall, in our model we assume two consumers who each have both biotech and nonbiotech products in their consumption bundle. For example, a husband and wife living in
the same home may have different preferences for both biotech and non-biotech products.
The model considers  as the proxy of the elasticity of substitution between biotech and
non-biotech products for consumer 1 and



for consumer 2. That is, by using the model

to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint (Arrow et al., 1961), we derive:
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1
1 
1
2 
1

1 

(8)

The parameters  1 and  2 are the elasticities of substitution between biotech and
non-biotech products. From (8), we can see that the greater the value of the parameter  ,
the greater the degree of substitutability between the two commodities for consumer 1.
Similarly, the greater the value of the parameter  , the greater the degree of
substitutability between the two commodities for consumer 2. Our model shows the
impact of preferences on the production of both commodities through the change in the
parameters  and  . It demonstrates that the magnitude of the impact of the degree of
substitutability between the two commodities on their productions depends on the factors
such as output elasticities of capital in biotech and non-biotech productions, the ratio of
the proportions of the biotech and non-biotech consumed by each consumer, and the
degree of substitutability between the commodities for both consumers. Since the utility
function of the two consumers are identical as well as the impact of their preferences on
the biotech production, we consider only the case of consumer 1, which is analogous to
that of consumer 2. The case for consumer 1 is divided into four sub-cases presented in
Table 4.2 below.
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Sub-case 1
The model predicts that if non-biotech output elasticity of capital is lower than
biotech output elasticity of capital, farmers will be tempted to invest more in biotech
products. However, if consumer 1 consumes less biotech than non-biotech products the
degree of substitutability of consumer 1 between biotech and non-biotech products is
negatively related to the change in the production of biotech. Suppose that the degree of
substitutability of consumer 1 decreases that is consumer 1 prefers less biotech products
than non- biotech products. Under these conditions, biotech producing farmers should be
discouraged in increasing biotech output but in case the preferences of consumer 2
outweigh that of consumer 1, biotech producer will increase its output.
Sub-case 2
We assume as in the previous case that if non-biotech output elasticity of capital
is lower than biotech output elasticity of capital, again farmers will be tempted to invest
more in biotech products. In addition, if consumer 1consumes more biotech than nonbiotech that is the degree of substitutability increases, farmers will produce more biotech
products. In economics standpoint, since input capital contribute more in biotech output
than non-biotech output and consumers also desire more biotech than non-biotech, it will
make sense for farmers to increase biotech output regardless of the preferences of the
other consumers.
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Sub-case 3
In this sub-case, we assume that non-biotech output elasticity of capital is greater
than biotech output elasticity of capital and consumer 1consumes less biotech than nonbiotech. In other words, farmers will be tempted to increase the capital in their nonbiotech production, but since consumer 1 prefers less biotech than non-biotech, a
decrease in the degree of substitutability will lead to lower production of biotech products
and vice versa.
Sub-case 4
We assume that non-biotech output elasticity of capital is greater than biotech
output elasticity of capital and consumer 1consumes more biotech than non-biotech. That
is, farmers will invest more capital in non-biotech production and the degree of
substitutability of consumer 1decreases. Under these conditions, the model predicts an
increase in the production of biotech which conflicts with economic theory. This situation
can only make economic sense if the preferences of biotech of other consumers in the
economy outweigh that of consumer 1.
4.2.3.4 Impact of the externalities
The production of the biotech products is subject to various externalities
generated by the technology. These externalities may be the proliferation of the new pests
causing more damage to the yields, the pollution of the ground water, and the destruction
of the biodiversity. The effect of such externalities on the productions of the biotech
products are negative and their size depends solely on biotech output elasticity of capital,
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total factor productivity and other factors of the model. These factors are in the
denominator which is already positive. The detailed discussion on the impact of the
externalities is presented in Table 4.3.
4.3 Conclusion
Should the South and EU adopt the Agricultural Biotechnology? The answer to
this question is complex when the enforcement of IPRs, consumers’ preferences and
externalities are to be considered. This paper develops a simple model that describes
some aspects of the current issues surrounding agricultural biotechnology. This paper
then uses the model to determine to what extent developing countries and EU countries
should produce biotech crops. The results are contingent upon the parameters of the
model, which include output elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech
productions, total factor productivity in biotech production, and the ratio of the
proportions of the biotech and non-biotech products consumed by each consumer.
Considering the impact of consumers’ preferences on the production of biotech products,
the results show that higher consumers’ preference of biotech products coupled with the
higher output elasticity of capital will lead to higher production of biotech products. This
result lines up with economic theory. As for the impact of the technology fee, biotech
producers will increase their production when the contribution of capital to the biotech
output is higher despite the technology fee. The impact of the externalities on the biotech
production is undoubtedly negative.
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The implication of this paper for future research is twofold: First, the results
predicted by the model are worthy of further investigation by conducting case studies
using empirical data. The case studies could be done by countries of by farmers in order
to determine how these results could relate to the actual real world biotech situations. We
plan to estimate biotech and non- production functions in order to determine the
estimated values of the output elasticities of capital either per countries of per farmers.
Second, for this paper to contribute more to our economic knowledge, we plan to conduct
welfare analysis to determine the impact of technology fees, consumers’ preferences and
the externalities on the consumers and producer surpluses.
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Table 4.1: Summary of the Results of the Model: Case of the Biotech Crops Production
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Table 4.2: The Impact of Consumer 1's Preferences on the Biotech Production
Sub-case 1
<θ

 ln X bt


 
    ln  a1 
 b1 

2[(1   )(  1)   (  1)]

a1  b1

Non-biotech output elasticity of
capital is lower than biotech output
elasticity of capital and Consumer
1consumes less biotech than nonbiotech.
Sub-case 2
<θ
a1  b1

Non-biotech output elasticity of
capital is lower than biotech output
elasticity of capital and Consumer
1consumes more biotech than nonbiotech.
Sub-case 3
>θ

 ln X bt
0

The degree of substitutability of
consumer 1 between biotech and nonbiotech products is negatively related to
the change in the production of biotech.

 ln X bt
0

The degree of substitutability of
consumer 1 between biotech and nonbiotech products is positively related to
the change in the production of biotech.

 ln X bt
0


The degree of substitutability of
consumer 1 between biotech and nonNon-biotech output elasticity of
capital is greater than biotech output biotech products is positively related to
the change in the production of biotech.
elasticity of capital and Consumer
1consumes
Sub-case 4 less biotech than non ln X bt
biotech
0
a1  b1

>θ



The degree of substitutability of
consumer 1 between biotech and nonNon-biotech output elasticity of
capital is greater than biotech output biotech products is negatively related to
the change in the production of biotech.
elasticity of capital and Consumer
1consumes more biotech than nonbiotech
a1  b1
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Table 4.3: The Impact of the Externalities on the Biotech Production
 ln X bt



 ln B
0
1     1     1

0    1;0  B  1

 ln X bt
0


Lower TFP in the production of biotech
means that the technology is not substantially
used, thus the impact of the externalities does
not impede the production of biotech crops.
0    1; B  1

 ln X bt
0


Higher TFP in the production of biotech
means that the technology is substantially
used, thus the impact of the externalities will
impede the production on biotech crops. In
other words, a substantial use of the biotech
seeds generates more negative externalities
which cause more damage to the yield. This
case lines up with the proliferation of new
pests.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
5.1. Discussion of Relevance
Despite powerful economic and political forces that are promoting the benefits of
the agricultural biotechnology, some countries are still reluctant in adopting it. Why?
Farmers in developing countries need some advanced technology to improve their
output. Also developing economies with predominant agricultural sector need to improve
their agricultural production in order to gain more from exporting their products to the
Rest of the World. Several institutions are claiming that agricultural biotechnology
improves yield, reduces the use of pesticides, increases farmers’ profit, and reduces
poverty. Traditionally, there is no flawless technology but agricultural biotechnology is
viewed by some groups of institutions as a perfect technology with solutions to all
agricultural problems. Of course, agricultural biotechnology does have some benefits
which should not be overlooked. However, it is important to consider not only the
economic benefits but also the more complex and varied social, environmental, health
and ethical implications of the technology. This dissertation has addressed these issues in
several ways by looking at more than just economic and direct benefits of the agricultural
biotechnology. Seed companies which are profit driven economic agents are just claiming
the positive characteristics of the agricultural biotechnology and are also lobbying several
research groups to promote the technology without considering any externality that might
occur in the future. For example, the proliferation of new pests upon the use of biotech
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seeds, the contamination of ground water by herbicide sprayed, and the heavy debt
burden on farmers in developing countries were not expected by the scientists who
invented the biotech seeds. However, these situations need to be considered with
transparency, and seed companies must take a proactive role in addressing the
information gap associated with their products, through accurate and transparent risk
communication. Furthermore, Government has to play a crucial role in imposing some
regulatory restrictions on biotech industries. For example, farmers should be protected
from the monopoly power of the seed companies. In addition, since consumers have the
right to know the ingredients in the products they are consuming, Govermnent should
impose labeling rules of the biotech products. Among other things, this research is
relevant because it considers the negative externalities associated with the agricultural
biotechnology.
5.2. Concluding Remarks
The issue of negative externality was indirectly investigated by considering the
impact of pest density on the output mean and output variance in the first essay. The
results from the stochastic production function show that both biotech varieties and
insecticides contribute to the increasing yield, while the insecticides experience
diminishing returns on yield due to ongoing pest densities. Another thing we should
consider from these results is that additional applications of insectides and extra hours of
work reduce yield risk, even though they increase costs. Moreover, we found that the
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yields of the non-biotech crops are almost exempt from the threat of the emerging pests,
and the use of insecticides was successful in increasing yield for those crops.
The impact of consumer preferences was considered in the second essay by
looking at the trade impact of EU consumer preferences and policy towards biotech
products. The results show that the impact of EU consumers’ preferences proxied by
three categories of commodities had significant impact on the imports between EU and
the Rest of the World. Furthermore, these preferences led to trade diversion on the
categories of Beverages and Tobacco and that of Animals and Vegetables Oils and Fats.
In contrast, trade creation was found in the category of Food and Live Animals. The
impact of the policies was not substantial and cannot be considered as either trade or
trade diversion.
In the third essay, we determine to what extent developing countries and EU
countries should produce biotech crops. The results are contingent upon the parameters of
the model, which include output elasticity of capital in both biotech and non-biotech
productions, total factor productivity in biotech production, and the ratio of the
proportions of the biotech and non-biotech products consumed by each consumer.
Considering the impact of consumers’ preferences on the production of biotech products,
the results show that higher consumers’ preference of biotech products coupled with
higher output elasticity of capital will lead to higher production of biotech products. This
result lines up with economic theory. As for the impact of the technology fee, biotech
producers will increase their production when the contribution of capital to the biotech
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output is higher despite the technology fee. The impact of the externalities on the biotech
production is undoubtedly negative.
5.3. Shortcomings and Future Research
This dissertation does have some limits. For example, the first essay shows the
impact of new pests on crops yield, but this was just indirect evidence in the sense that
the data of pest density was not used. Pest density was proxied by additional sprays of
insecticides and extra hours of work due to the presence of new pests. We plan to use pest
population in our regression upon the availability of pest density data. Moreover, the
damage control production function will be used in order to determine yield loss in the
presence of new pests when farmers apply damage control agents like biotech seeds and
insecticides.
The second essay, in which gravity model of international trade was used to
capture trade consequences of the EU restrictive trade policy, is the starting point of our
research agenda. In this essay, we fail to capture the trade effect of EU restrictive trade
policy towards biotechnology. The estimates of the policy variable are negative but not
significant. Also, we found trade creation in the category of Food and Live Animals.
These results conflict with our expectations. We thus plan to break down the data into
more than three categories of the commodities. Furthermore, intra EU and growth
implications will be investigated as well as the export loss of developing adopting
countries.
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The shortcoming of the third essay is that seed companies were not considered as
an economic agent in the general equilibrium model, and there were also lack of practical
analyses. We also made many unrealistic assumptions in order to make the model
tractable. The implication of this essay for future research is twofold: First, seed
companies will be considered as a third economic agent. Second, empirical investigations
will be conducted through case studies for some selected countries and we hope to
eventually develop a more realistic model in order to more confidently determine the
optimum level of consumption and production for specific countries, as well as offer
some plausible level of welfare analysis.

